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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2282 
___________ 
 
OWEN DOVOVAN JOHNSON, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-186-854) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 20, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 14, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Owen Donovan Johnson, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitions for review of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the following reasons, we 
will deny the petition for review.   
 Johnson was admitted to the United States in 1990 as a nonimmigrant visitor for 
pleasure and, in 2006, adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident (LPR).  In 2012, a 
jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found 
Johnson guilty of both counts of a two-count indictment, charging him with conspiracy to 
commit bank fraud and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344.  
Based on that conviction, the Government charged Johnson as removable under 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] because he had committed an aggravated felony as defined in INA 
§ 101(a)(43)(M) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)] (classifying as an aggravated felony any 
offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000) and 
INA § 101(a)(43)(U) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U)] (providing that “an attempt or 
conspiracy to commit” another aggravated felony constitutes an aggravated felony).   
 An Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Johnson was removable as charged.  
Johnson appealed, arguing that the Government could not demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that § 101(a)(43)(M)’s $10,000 loss threshold had been met.  The 
BIA disagreed, noting that the presentence investigation report (PSR) indicated that 
Johnson’s involvement in a mortgage fraud scheme resulted in a loss amount over $3 
million.  The Board also rejected Johnson’s claim that a remand was warranted so that he 
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could apply for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(h) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)].  
Johnson filed a timely petition for review.   
 We generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien, 
like Johnson, who is removable for having committed an aggravated felony.  See INA 
§ 242(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)].  We retain jurisdiction, however, to review 
constitutional claims, “pure questions of law,” and “issues of application of law to fact, 
where the facts are undisputed and not the subject of challenge.”  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 
420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); see also INA § 242(a)(2)(D) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D)].  Johnson raises questions of law, namely, whether his conviction is an 
aggravated felony and whether he is statutorily eligible for a § 212(h) waiver.  See Jeune 
v. Att’y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007); Poveda v. Att’y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168, 
1172 (11th Cir. 2012).  Therefore, we decline the Government’s invitation to dismiss the 
petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.      
 Johnson concedes that his conviction involved fraud, but he argues that the 
Government failed to demonstrate that his offense caused a loss of greater than $10,000 
to a victim or victims.  We disagree.  Pursuant to Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 40 
(2009), the agency and courts considering whether a conviction is an aggravated felony 
under § 101(a)(43)(M) should apply a “circumstance-specific” approach, rather than a 
categorical approach, to determine whether the alien’s crime involved a loss to the victim 
over $10,000.  The Supreme Court stated that “the loss must be tied to the specific counts 
covered by the conviction.”  Id. at 42.  In Nijhawan, the alien had stipulated at sentencing 
that the loss exceeded $100 million.  The Supreme Court held that it was not unfair for 
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the IJ to refer to sentencing-related material in determining the loss amount for purposes 
of § 101(a)(43)(M).  Id. at 43.  Indeed, we have held that the BIA’s reliance on a PSR in 
conducting the circumstance-specific approach does not render a removal proceeding 
fundamentally unfair.  See Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 Here, the record clearly and convincingly supports the BIA’s conclusion that the 
loss to the victims exceeded $10,000, and that that loss was tied to the specific counts 
covered by the conviction.  According to the PSR, Johnson “committed mortgage fraud 
involving at least 22 properties, including the nine properties charged in the indictment, 
plus an additional 13 properties that constitute relevant conduct. . . .  [T]he Government 
calculated the loss amount based on an estimate using 30 percent of the total mortgage 
price of the 22 properties, which was approximately $3,097,496.40.”  We recognize that 
the $10,000 threshold cannot be satisfied with losses related to the 13 properties 
constituting only “unconvicted” relevant conduct.  See Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 
106 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the plain language of the statute “forecloses inclusion of 
losses stemming from unconvicted offenses.” (quoting Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 
733, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2005))).  But the PSR indicates that several of the nine properties 
identified in Count One of the indictment involved losses exceeding $10,000.  See Singh 
v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 503, 512 (3d Cir. 2012) (indicating that circumstance-specific 
approach properly includes examination of the indictment).  For example, Johnson was 
convicted of using a fraudulent mortgage application to obtain a loan totaling 
approximately $609,076 to purchase property located at 254A Saratoga Avenue, 
Brooklyn, New York.  Using the “30 percent of the total mortgage price” calculation that 
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the Government employed, the actual loss from this single transaction equaled 
approximately $183,000, well above the $10,000 threshold.1  See id. at 510 (holding that 
the Government must prove actual loss, rather than intended or potential loss).   
 Johnson also alleges that the Board erred in concluding that he is not statutorily 
eligible for relief under INA § 212(h).  That section provides the Attorney General with 
discretion to waive inadmissibility if the alien establishes that his departure would cause 
hardship to a spouse, parent, son, or daughter who is a United States citizen or lawful 
permanent resident.2  INA § 212(h)(1)(B) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B)].  Notably, however, 
a lawful permanent resident present in the United States may obtain a § 212(h) waiver 
“only if he is an applicant for admission or assimilated to the position of an applicant for 
                                              
1 We reject Johnson’s claim that the loss amount did not exceed $10,000 because the 
Judgment did not order restitution.  Notably, the Judgment did direct Johnson to forfeit 
almost $5 million in United States currency, which the PSR identified as “property . . . 
involved in the offense . . . for which he is jointly and severally liable.”  There is also no 
merit to Johnson’s assertion that no victims were established as a result of his criminal 
offense.  The PSR indicated that “the victims in this case were Nationstar Mortgage and 
Citimortgage Inc; however the loans guaranteed by these lenders were bought by other 
lenders.”  Although the identity of the “other lenders” was not known at the time of 
sentencing, Johnson has not convincingly alleged that the lenders who purchased the 
loans are not victims.  Finally, Johnson’s assertion in his Reply Brief that he is currently 
challenging his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not affect the finality of that 
conviction for immigration purposes.  See Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 542 (3d 
Cir. 2014) 
 
2 Section 212(h) also provides that “an alien who has previously been admitted to the 
United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” who is later 
convicted of an aggravated felony, is statutorily ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility.  
8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  This aggravated felony bar does not apply to Johnson, however, 
because he was admitted on a visitor’s visa and only later adjusted his status to that of an 
LPR.  Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 487 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that § 212(h) 
precludes a waiver only for those persons who, at the time they lawfully entered into the 
United States, had attained the status of lawful permanent resident).   
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admission by applying for an adjustment of status.”  Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1177; see also 
Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[A]liens who are already in the 
United States must apply for an adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255; upon 
application, the applicant is assimilated to the position of an alien outside the United 
States seeking entry as an immigrant.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, “the 
statute does not provide for an alien in removal proceedings to obtain a ‘stand alone’ 
waiver without an application for adjustment of status.”  In re Rivas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 130, 
132-33 (BIA 2013); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(f) (“an application [for adjustment of 
status] shall be the sole method of requesting the exercise of discretion under sections 
212(g), (h), (i), and (k) of the Act, as they relate to the inadmissibility of an alien in the 
United States.”).   
 Johnson did not apply for adjustment of status and essentially faults the IJ for 
failing to advise him of the opportunity to do so.  Cf. Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 
442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting BIA authority for the proposition that “[a]n IJ has a duty 
to inform aliens of potential forms of relief for which they are apparently eligible . . .”).  
But any error by the IJ was harmless because Johnson’s purported basis for seeking 
adjustment – an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative – was not approvable.  See Coraggioso 
v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 730, 733 (3d Cir. 2004) (providing that to be prima facie eligible 
for adjustment of status, an alien must have an immediately available visa).  In particular, 
although Johnson sought to rely on an I-130 petition filed by his 27 year-old son, who is 
an LPR, there is currently no corresponding immigrant visa category for the parent of a 
lawful permanent resident.  See INA § 203(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)].  Johnson also has a 
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12 year-old son who is a United States citizen, but that son cannot petition on Johnson’s 
behalf until he turns 21 years old.  See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)]. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
